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Information and analysis constitute only one route among
several to social problem solving... [A] great deal of the
world's problem solving is and ought to be accomplished
through various forms of social interaction that substitute
action for thought, understanding, or analysis. Information
and analysis are not a universal or categorical prescription
for problem solving.
- Charles E. Lindblom and David K Cohen1
The organizer should know and accept that the right reason
is only introduced as a moral rationalization after the right
end has been achieved, although it may have been achieved
for the wrong reason-therefore he should search for and
use the wrong reasons to achieve the right goals. He should
be able, with skill and calculation, to use irrationality in his
attempts to progress toward a rational world.
- Saul D. Alinsky
I. INTRODUCTION
Those who are interested in the concept of sustainable
development, and in the ecosystem approach as a means of achieving
sustainability, often begin from the premise that our current pattern of
economic growth is irrational. Sooner or later, it is argued, a system
based on the pursuit of endless growth in resource consumption must
come crashing down as it encounters the limits of a finite natural world.
It seems to follow from this initial insight that our fundamental task is
to design and implement a more rational system of economic activity.
If we can put in place policies, institutions, and laws calculated to make
our systems of production and consumption more consistent with
ecological processes, then our current rush toward the biological brink
may be slowed or even halted.
1. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING 10 (1979).
2. SAUL D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS 76 (1971).
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From this perspective, the key to survival is "learning our way
out.' '3 Learning may be broadly defined, as it is in Milbrath's work,4
but still the dominant impression is of the rational pursuit of better
paradigms, models, and data sets. The Brundtland Commissions
ground-breaking report on sustainable development, Our Common
Future,' also assumes that rational-technocratic improvements will
point the way to a sustainable future. The report concludes that we
need to seek institutional and legal change through improvements in
"assessing global risks," "making informed choices," and "dealing with
the effects."6 Like much of the contemporary discourse in economics,
law, and policy analysis, the sustainable development literature assumes
that because most human activity is determined by rational pursuit of
self-interest, all social and political change must be sought through
rational analysis and manipulation of incentive structures. Without
contesting either the irrationality of many aspects of the current
economy or the power of analytical rationality, it is worth emphasizing
that an exclusive focus on the rational aspects of sustainable
development provides a very narrow perspective. This truncated vision
can unduly constrain thinking about ways to move toward a more
sustainable society.
The limitations of an exclusively rational framework can be
illustrated by briefly reviewing alternative perspectives on an analogous
shift in economic organization: the transition from a sustainable to an
unsustainable pattern of resource use when native peoples in North
America began to participate in the market economy through the
colonial fur trade.
3. See LESTER W. MILBRATH, ENVISIONING A SUITABLE SOCIETY: LEARNING OUR
WAY OUT (1989).
4. For example, Milbrath makes clear that learning new values is at least as
important as factual learning, and that social learning should include practice along
with theory, and citizen participation along with expert study. Id. at 100-01, 103-04,
112-13. He also notes that there are many strategies for seeking social change, each
of which may imply a slightly different focus for social learning. Id. at 362-80.
5. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1987).
6. Id. at 20-21.
1993]
66 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1
II. SUSTAINABILITY AND RATIONALITY
A. From Sustainable Systems to Endless-Growth: Native North
Americans and the Tragedy of the Commons
From the economic perspective, the fur trade of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries was a classic example of comparative
advantage. England, France, and other European trading nations
offered superior goods, based on improved manufacturing technologies
in metalworking and weaving. The native peoples had access to
abundant supplies of furs and hides that were highly valued by the
European clothing industry. As the pace of trade increased, however,
the Indians encountered the tragedy of the commons. Beavers and other
fur-bearing mammals were hunted beyond their capacity to reproduce,
the harvest declined, and hunters found themselves investing more and
more effort for a dwindling return. Eventually, some of the tribes
devised the classic technique for internalizing this externality: they
created property rights in what had previously been an unregulated
commons.
However, historical and anthropological research paints a different
and more disturbing portrait of the native peoples' first encounters with
a market economy. In place of this superficially consensual model of
trade based on comparative advantage, social research highlights the
many forms of coercion that compelled the native peoples to enter the
market economy.8 The colonial powers' strategy of playing one tribe
against another created an "arms race" in which the natives had to
secure weapons as a means of survival. Even with this incentive, and
with European traders resorting to anti-competitive practices like price-
fixing to increase the Indians' hunting incentives, natives did not
produce sufficient pelts to satisfy the European market demand.9
Liquor helped to fill the gap and increase the native hunters' diligence.
In significant respects, alcohol was an ideal trade good, similar to heroin
or crack cocaine today: its addictive properties made the natives eager
7. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 357
(1967).
8. One example was the need to secure firearms and ammunition as essential
tools for gaining access to the remaining hunting grounds. Native peoples who failed
to trade for modern weapons were often displaced or annihilated by those who had
successfully entered the market economy. See, e.g., FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE
AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE 80-83 (1984) [hereinafter IROQUOIS EMPIRE].
9. THOMAS E. NORTON, THE FUR TRADE IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, 1686-1776 70-
71 (1974).
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but incompetent market participants.10 Later, as tribes were forced to
sell off their ancestral lands through force and stratagem, they were
often compelled to depend on the market economy as their only
alternative for survival.
While these incentives forced the Indians to adapt to the market
economy, behaving like a European market participant was alien to the
pre-contact Indian cultures and the transition was both difficult and
destructive for them. In native cultures that "stressed sharing instead
of investment,"" profit-taking and capital accumulation might have
been antisocial acts. In extreme cases, the Indian who acted as a
rational profit-maximizer could have been regarded as a lunatic, and a
threat to his society." Participation in the fur trade may also have
been facilitated by (and may have contributed to) the disintegration of
the native peoples' spiritual beliefs, premised as they were on animistic
norms of mutual respect and support between the human and
nonhuman parts of nature.
13
In short, the history of the fur trade reinforces the insight of
economic anthropology that "economic behavior [caninot be extracted or
disentangled from the rest of social life. [It is] better understood as part
of the larger whole."' 4 If economic activity is deeply "embedded" in the
beliefs, practices, and assumptions of our culture, then any attempt to
move in the direction of sustainability should incorporate theories about
how cultures change and what techniques can be used to facilitate
desired changes. The legal system is one important arena for studying
10. Id. at 67-69.
11. IROQUOIS EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 69.
12. FARLEY MOWAT, PEOPLE OF THE DEER 82-97 (1952).
13. See CALVIN MARTIN, KEEPERS OF THE GAME: INDIAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE FUR TRADE (1978). Martin develops the hypothesis that disease epidemics,
which the Indians attributed to the spiritual guardians of hunted animals like the
beaver, were taken by the Indians as evidence that the animals had declared war on
humans. Thus, it became legitimate for the Indians to retaliate by hunting animals
without restriction, disregarding the normal rituals and taboos that served to limit
the number of animals taken in the hunt. Id. at 129-30, 146. Martin's hypothesis,
it should be noted, is widely disputed. See IROQUOIS EMPIRE, supra note 8;
ELISABETH TOOKER, NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY OF THE EASTERN
WOODLANDS 9-10 (1979) INDIANS, ANIMALS, AND THE FUR TRADE: A CRITIQUE OF
KEEPERS OF THE GAME (Separd Krech, III ed., 1981). In any event, it seems clear
that most of the eastern tribes involved in the fur trade had religious beliefs in the
pre-contact period that attributed human-like attributes to many aspects of nature,
including objects like stones that Europeans regarded as inanimate.
14. Stephen B. Brush, Economics and Cultures, 247 SCIENCE 1349 (1990)
(reviewing STUART PLATTNER, ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY (1989)).
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the process of change, because in North American societies the legal
system constitutes and embodies fundamental norms governing human
use of the natural world. As we face the difficult transition from an
economy based upon unlimited growth to one that seeks sustainable
development, our legal system strains to redefine itself in fundamental
ways.
B. Returning to Sustainable Development: Legal Conditions
As the fur trade example indicates, economic and cultural change
can sometimes be imposed by overwhelming external forces. However,
such change is disruptive and painful for the societies involved. In the
case of the transition from an endless-growth economy to a sustainable
system, the most likely external force compelling change would be large-
scale, irreversible ecological collapse.
Any significant modification of natural systems, such as major
changes in climatic conditions or amounts of ultraviolet radiation
reaching the earth's surface, would surely reverberate through the
affected human societies, forcibly restructuring not only the material
conditions of life but also political conditions, legal regimes, and
ideologies and beliefs. One alternative to this bleak prospect is
anticipatory cultural and political change, which could be more gradual
and less disruptive of existing social institutions. As Errol Meidinger
points out,15 cultures are detailed and complex, often embodying
conflicting visions of good or appropriate behavior. At any time, the
dominant themes of a culture may be subject to challenge by alternative
visions. Those visions may be motivated by conceptions of the good
society, or they may be motivated by self-interest. Ultimately, however,
interests are defined and constituted by the group, in what is
fundamentally a political process." According to Meidinger, "the most
creative political activity often is aimed at opening up possibilities of
new types of collective action ... [c]onflicting principles and difference
can therefore be seen as an engine of social change."'"
Before that engine can run, however, it needs an appropriate
infrastructure, just as an automobile needs roads, fuel, liability insurers,
traffic laws, and other background conditions which enable it to operate
effectively. In the same manner, a minimally adequate supporting
structure needs to be put in place before an alternative cultural ideal
15. Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture, 9 LAW & POLICY 355, 361 (1987).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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such as sustainable development may be widely articulated, debated,
accepted, and implemented.
III. POLLUTION AND THE ROLE OF LAW
A. Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Law
Law can play both instrumental and expressive roles in mediating
difficult social issues like the proper relationship between human
economic activity and the natural world. Instrumentally, laws like those
governing the release of pollutants into the Great Lakes constitute a set
of authoritative instructions issued by politically legitimate institutions.
Behavior that exceeds those instructions is either punishable as a
violation, or voidable as ultra vires. Law in this instrumental sense is
important to the search for ecosystem protection and sustainable
development, as it sets boundaries both on economic activity and on
government regulation of that activity.
While this function of law as an instrument for carrying out social
policy usually receives the most attention, law's expressive functions can
be equally important in determining the direction and magnitude of
social change. To the narrative school of legal jurisprudence, "law is a
compendium of stories about how we use and abuse rules to manage our
social relations and resolve both our differences and commonality."1 "
Because law embodies the normative judgments of the community, the
legal narratives associated with cases, statutes, and regulatory decisions
"serve as instructive moral parables, presented to most people as stark,
melodramatic media distillations.""9  In short, law is an important
arena within which the cultural conflict over visions of the good (and the
minimally acceptable) society are worked out. In this respect, law can
be studied to learn how dominant values are articulated and defended,
and how competing alternative visions are neutralized or consigned to
the margins of discourse.'
18. James R. Elkins, From the Symposium Editor, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2
(1990).
19. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1407, 1409 (1990) [hereinafter Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law].
20. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281-93 (David Kairys ed., 1982):
If what is important about law is that it functions to 'legitimate" the
existing order, one starts to ask how it does that ... [one of the
important things to study is] all the ways in which the system seems
at first glance basically uncontroversial, neutral, acceptable. This is
19931
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A foreign visitor studying the efforts of Canada and the United
States to control pollution in the Great Lakes might well be puzzled by
the disparity between effort and outcome. During the past two decades,
there has been massive amount of lawmaking and policy implementation
designed to reverse the environmental degradation of the Great Lakes.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has been amended twice
since 1972, each time becoming more elaborate and detailed in its
prescriptions. Statutes, regulations, case law, and administrative
decisions relating to pollution discharges in the region have proliferated
at a seemingly geometric rate; a host of commissions, offices, bureaus,
and advisory committees have been spawned to implement them.
Despite this bustle of activity, however, authoritative bodies like the
Government of Canada21 and the International Joint Commission'
continue to warn that Great Lakes pollution is a threat both to human
health and to the integrity of the ecosystem.
The environmental community has responded to this discrepancy
between effort and outcome by advocating changes in the structure of
applicable laws. As indicated by the 1991 Joint Report of the National
Wildlife Federation and the Canadian Institute for Environmental Law
and Policy,' the principal environmental advocates in the Great Lakes
basin seek legal changes such as reversing the burden of proof on
dischargers of certain classes of chemicals, 4 providing more careful
consideration of cross-media effects,' moving from permits based on
Antonio Gramsci's notion of "hegemony," Le., that the most effective
kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated
classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal
changes, is satisfactory, or at least represents the most that anyone
could expect, because things pretty much have to be the way they are.
Id. at 286.
21. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, Toxic CHEMICALS IN THE GREAT LAKES AND
ASSOCIATED EFFECTS (1991).
22. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA AND THE STATE AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE
GREAT LAKES BASIN, PARTS I AND 11 (1990).
23. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION AND THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, A PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTHY GREAT LAKES: A
REPORT OF THE PROGRAM FOR ZERO DISCHARGE (1991).
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 25. Environmental regulation has evolved in the U.S. and Canada
through separate statutes, programs, and implementing offices for each "medium" of
pollution, such as water discharges, air emissions, and toxic waste dumps.
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concentrations to those based on mass loadings," and phasing out or
banning especially dangerous chemicals.'
Experience provides some grounds for skepticism that these
reforms, if enacted, would accomplish the desired results. Zero
discharge of persistent toxic chemicals and universal achievement of
fishable, swimmable waters have been goals of the U.S. Clean Water
Ace since 1972. Authority to ban or require pre-market testing of
dangerous chemicals has been in place nearly as long, but only a
handful of substances have been regulated under the American Toxic
Substances Control Act.' Thus, statutory regulation of harmful
substances has developed far ahead of the political will for enforcement.
In this field of pollution control, there is a need for a workable theory
explaining the relationship between the law on the books and the law's
inaction.
One useful approach is suggested by Alan Freeman's work on race
discrimination law. Freeman postulates that American race discrimin-
ation law is designed to avoid confronting the realities of institutional
racism because it adopts a perpetrator perspective rather than a victim
perspective.' ° The perpetrator perspective assumes that a social
problem like racism can be solved by identifying and punishing a few
individual bad behaviors that take place against a background of
generally acceptable conduct."' Those who are not identified as
perpetrators based on their individual fault are by definition innocent
bystanders, absolved of stigma or the need to change.32 If there are no
bad actors for the legal system to sanction, then any problems that the
victim is experiencing must be his or her own fault.' This narrow
definition of the problem to be solved serves as a shield against more
Coordination across these separate media programs is variable, but generally
regarded as inadequate.
26. Id. at 26-27.
27. Id. at 21-23.
28. Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 76 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (1988)).
29. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-519, 100 Stat. 2989
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988)).
30. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-
Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978) [hereinafter Freeman, Racial Discrimination]; Freeman,
Antidiscrimination Law supra note 19.
31. Freeman, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 1053.
32. Id. at 1055.
33. Id. at 1054.
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fundamental reforms, as demands for change can then be met with the
assertion either that there is no problem, or that solutions should be
sought through tougher enforcement of existing perpetrator-oriented
laws. 4
A similar point was made by Murray Edelman' when he noted
that providing purely symbolic reassurance is an important function of
regulatory statutes and their administration:
Some of the most widely publicized administrative activities
can most confidently be expected to convey a sense of
well-being to the onlooker because they suggest vigorous
activity while in fact signifying inactivity or protection of the
"regulated."
The most obvious kinds of dissemination of symbolic
satisfactions are to be found in administrative dicta
accompanying decisions and orders, in press releases, and in
annual reports. It is not uncommon to give the rhetoric to
one side and the decision to the other.'
Edelman's brief catalog suggests that there may be common
patterns of behavior or bureaucratic tactics for avoiding major change
within a regulatory domain. The implementation of the U.S. Clean
Water Act is a useful area for exploring and elaborating Edelman's
approach, because it provides a rich inventory of methods for
disregarding or marginalizing the ecosystem approach, and for deflecting
challenges to the premises of economic growth.
B. Watering Down the Clean Water Act: Marginalization of the
Ecosystem Approach
When the U.S. Clean Water Act3 took on its present shape in
1972, the law contained several provisions that were even stronger than
the current versions of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Like
the Agreement, the Clean Water Act called for zero discharge.' In two
34. Id. at 1056.
35. MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
36. Id. at 38-39.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1251, supra note 28.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(aXl).
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respects, however, it was significantly more stringent: zero discharge
was not limited to persistent toxic chemicals, but rather applied to all
pollutants;39 and a definite timetable was specified for achieving zero
discharge, including interim goals and timetables. 0
The Clean Water Act also adopted an ecosystem approach, stating
that the law's objective was "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."41 In addition
to a new national discharge permit system, the Act specifically provided
authority for pollution prevention initiatives in the Great Lakes
basin;4 gave the federal government a mandate for a multi-jurisdic-
tional, cross-media demonstration program to develop remedial actions
for restoring beneficial uses of Lake Erie;43 and authorized the federal
government to contract for the assessment and remediation of
contaminated sediments.4 According to the Act:
39. Id. § 1251(aXl)-(2).
40. Under 33 U.S.C. § 1251(aX1), discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters (which was eventually interpreted to mean all significant surface waters) was
to cease by 1985. As an interim goal, fishable and swimmable waters were to be
achieved by July 1, 1983 "wherever attainable." Id. § 1251(aX2). The zero discharge
point was hammered home even more specifically for toxic chemicals, where the
relevant provision emphasized that "it is the national policy that the discharge of
toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited." Id. § 1251(aX3).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(aXl).
42. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency was authorized
to make 75% matching grants to state or other public agencies for demonstration
projects relating to "removal of pollutants and prevention of any polluting matter
from entering into the Great Lakes in the future." Id. § 1255(a); see id. § 1255(c)
(general authority to make grants for research and development projects relating to
"prevention of water pollution by industry").
43. The Army Corps of Engineers was to be the lead agency in developing a
program "for the rehabilitation and environmental repair of Lake Erie." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1258(dX1). The program was to be developed "in cooperation with the
Environmental Protection Agency, other interested departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the Federal Government, and the States and their political
subdivisions." Id. § 1258(dX2). The Act also had a general directive that public
participation in the development of any program "shall be provided for, encouraged,
and assisted" by the Administrator [of EPA] and the States. Id. § 1251(e). The
rehabilitation program for Lake Erie "should include measures to control point
sources of pollution, area sources of pollution, including.., urban runoff and rural
runoff, and in place sources of pollution, including bottom loads, sludge banks, and
polluted harbor dredgings." Id. § 1258(dX2).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1268(cX3).
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The Administrator is directed to identify the location of
in-place pollutants with emphasis on toxic pollutants in
harbors and navigable waterways,-and is authorized, acting
through the Secretary of the Army, to make contracts for the
removal and appropriate disposal of such materials from
critical port and harbor areas.
4 5
Fifteen million dollars were authorized for this contaminated
sediment remediation. In these respects, the 1972 law seems entirely
consistent with the demands being made today by Great Lakes
environmental organizations like the National Wildlife Federation and
Great Lakes United.
If these policies and programs have been incorporated into federal
statutes for twenty years, why do they remain unfulfilled promises? The
short answer is that insiders in the field of pollution control did not
support stringent requirements like the zero discharge goal, and did not
believe that Congress really meant them to be implemented as written.
To EPA's top administrators, the mandate to achieve zero discharge on
a short timetable was a "revolutionary change" made in response to
swings in public opinion without any careful investigation of the
consequences.46 EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus emphasized his belief
that setting unrealistic statutory standards would undermine respect for
the government," and zero discharge was regarded as hopelessly
unrealistic. 8 Thus, even though the Congress passed zero discharge
with only minor qualifying amendments, this portion of the Act was
branded from the start as purely symbolic legislation.
Marginalization of the Act's ecosystem objective of restoring and
maintaining "the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters"49 followed a slightly different path. In this instance,
the ambiguity of the concept of"integrity," which was not defined in the
Act, proved fatal to implementation. By 1975, agency water program
administrators had established a simple syllogism to resolve the
integrity problem: (a) if "integrity" had any meaning, it referred to the
pristine quality of water that existed before European settlement of
North America; (b) Congress could not seriously have meant for the
agency to implement requirements that would assure pristine waters,
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1265.
46. JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 149 (1976).
47. Id. at 154.
48. Id. at 163.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
INSTITUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY
because that would be either physically impossible or prohibitively
expensive in the context of a modern economy; (c) therefore, "integrity"
can be reinterpreted to mean whatever quality of water will result from
implementing the operational programs of the Act in a reasonable
manner.' Framing the decision in this way--as a choice between an
impossible dream and a comfortable status quo--EPA not surprisingly
opted for the latter.
C. The Methodology of Marginalization: Three Aspects of Regulatory
Reasonableness
Freed of the potentially radical implications of zero discharge and
an ecosystem approach, EPA and the states were able to proceed with
"reasonable" implementation in ways that are consistent with Freeman's
concept of a perpetrator perspective. Three aspects of regulatory
reasonableness deserve mention.
1. Consideration of Economic Factors. The first, and perhaps the
most important aspect of regulatory reasonableness, is the role of
economic considerations in decisionmaking. Under the Clean Water Act,
no interpretive gamesmanship was required, as the law had clearly
injected economic factors into the decisional calculus at several levels.
The Act's primary line of defense against pollution, permit limits based
on the best available technology economically achievable,51 explicitly
directed the agency to take the cost of controls into account. When
technological limitations still left significant sources of pollution in a
waterway, the back-up system of water quality limits came into effect.
Water quality decisions gave weight to economic factors at two levels of
decisionmaking. First, states could consider abatement costs and
impacts on industry when they classified each waterway for its "best
use." Second, when the state pollution control agencies later wrote
legally enforceable standards for each use-class of waterways, they could
rely on economic factors to modify or weaken the scientifically-based
water quality criteria issued by EPA. These use classifications and
water quality standards would then determine the discharge limits
written into individual permits.
Although weighing economic costs against environmental gains is
not unusual in environmental regulation, it should be emphasized that
this type of cost-benefit analysis implies a perpetrator perspective. High
50. Barry B. Boyer, Ecosystem, Legal System, and the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, 41 Buff. L. Rev. (forthcoming Summer 1993).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(bX1XB).
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abatement cost becomes an acceptable justification for continuing to
pollute, and the class of punishable perpetrators is limited to those who
could reduce their discharges at low cost, but have failed to do so.
Moreover, because cost considerations are often made within an
atmosphere of unconfined discretion at the state level, regulated firms
can play states against one another, driving the acceptable levels of
pollution down to a lowest common denominator. As Thomas Jorling
has pointed out, the inclusion of economic factors in the water quality
system gives it a strong bias toward the status quo: "Applying benefit
and cost analysis assures that our society will not change; for, by
definition, any change which would cause a significant alteration in any
pattern of [economic activity in] the existing society . . . is an
unacceptable cost." 2 More generally, if a shift from unsustainable to
sustainable forms of economic activity is necessary, a cost-benefit
approach will not provide much impetus for change, because it cuts off
exploration of most alternatives to the current system.
2. Restriction of Benefits. A second way in which a "reasonable"
approach to water quality regulation limits the liability of polluters is
through restricting the acknowledged benefits of pollution control to
human consumptive uses. New York's stream classification system, for
example, recognizes only four protectable human uses of waterways:
drinking water, body contact recreation, fish propagation, and fish
survival.' Pollution which does not undermine any of these
consumptive uses does not, by definition, impair water quality, and
therefore those who discharge such pollution are wholly innocent. By
contrast, the use impairments listed in the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement broaden the definition of "use" to include non-game plants
and animals (phytoplankton, zooplankton, benthos, algae, and
wildlife).' They also incorporate suitable habitat, along with freedom
from tumors, deformities, and reproductive problems for fish and
wildlife.' A water quality system based on the Agreement's concept
of protectable uses would probably legitimize far less pollution than the
water quality systems used by most states.
52. Thomas Jorling, Incorporating Ecological Interpretation into Basic Statutes,
in OFFICE OF WATER AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, THE INTEGRITY OF WATER 9, 13 (1975).
53. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 701 (1991).
54. 1987 Protocol Amending the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978,
Nov. 18, 1987, U.S.-Can., Hein's No. KAV 255, Annex 2, sect. 1(cXxii).
55. Id.
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3. Selective Reliance on History. A third aspect of "reasonable
interpretation" has emerged in the treatment of human consumptive
uses: selective reliance on history. Here, periods of heavier pollution
are given as a baseline for determining threshold levels of contaminants.
In this way, pre- and post-industrial periods can be downgraded, or
ignored. Thus, since many of the Great Lakes region's public drinking
water systems have moved their intakes far offshore to find relatively
unpolluted water and have installed chlorination equipment to kill
sewage bacteria, there is no "need" to use harbors, nearshore areas, or
the mouths of tributary streams for drinking water. These may remain
classified for lower uses.
Similarly, if a state like New York refuses to classify a stream
like the Buffalo River as "swimmable" unless somebody proposes to open
a bathing beach on the river, it will not have to concern itself with the
troublesome questions of reclassification. When the river was heavily
polluted during the industrial period, municipalities invested in
alternatives like public swimming pools and beaches in cleaner, more
remote areas. If local children persist in exposing themselves to
pathogens by swimming in a river not classified for that use, then any
resulting disease is their own fault. In other words, the sewer authority
is not a perpetrator when its sewers overflow and dump excrement into
the river.
D. Marginalization through Interpretation of Scientific Data
Even when regulatory decisionmaking purports to be purely
scientific or technical, political choices can be made to exclude,
marginalize, or ignore certain factors. Under the Clean Water Act, the
Environmental Protection Agency's formulation of water quality criteria,
which guides the states in writing legally enforceable standards, is
ostensibly a purely scientific enterprise. The statute directs the agency
to issue and revise criteria "accurately reflecting the latest scientific
knowledge ... on... all identifiable effects on health and welfare...
[and] on the effects of pollutants on biological community diversity,
productivity, and stability."''  In devising its methodology for
developing criteria," EPA justified many of its choices as dictated by
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)-(aXl).
57. Water Quality Criteria Documents; Availability, 45 Fed. Reg. 79,318,
79,341-79 (1980) [hereinafter Criteria Documents]. The application of those criteria
methodologies to the Great Lakes is currently being re-examined as part of the
Agency's Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative, and through this process EPA's
position on these methodological issues may change. Also, comparing EPA's 1980
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scientific judgment. However, many of those choices are fundamentally
opposed to positions taken by other scientific bodies studying water
quality in the Great Lakes basin.
One of the most fundamental choices in developing water quality
criteria is how to deal with limited data. EPA chose to require a large
amount of data for criteria formulation. For example, to assess
freshwater acute toxicity, laboratory data must be available for at least
eight different families of organisms, including salmonid and
non-salmonid fish, planktonic and benthic crustaceans, benthic insects,
and benthic detritivores." In addition, laboratory data should be
available to generate acute/chronic ratios for at least three species of
animals, and there should also be at least one test with freshwater
plants. Other data may also be required in special cases, and any data
that are questionable or not available in hard copy should be discarded.
If not enough data are available, no criterion should be developed.
EPA's treatment of these data requirements contrasts with the
discussion of human health standards in the 1989 Report of the
International Joint Commission's Science Advisory Board.59 The Board
noted that requiring proof of harm before a chemical pollutant could be
banned or regulated "is dysfunctional and unscientific."'  According to
the Board, "[s]cience does not operate on the basis of 'proof.' It
progresses by establishing 'null' hypotheses and disproving them."61
Thus, a more "scientific" formulation of the question might be: how
much evidence do we have to overlook in order to conclude that this
substance is safe? The Board made clear that putting a high burden of
proof on agencies to prove that each chemical is harmful would unduly
shield polluters and expose humans and animals to harm because "[o]ne
by one 'proof of harm can never keep pace with the rates of introduction
criteria approach to other scientific bodies' later statements--in some instances, as
much as ten years later--might be faulted for criticizing with the benefit of hindsight.
However, that should not undermine the validity of the point made in text: if the
scientific consensus on important methodological issues can shift so radically in a
decade, this suggests that the relevant methodology is neither immutable nor
indisputable. In other words, seemingly scientific methodological norms may result
from a process of social construction reflecting value choices, unprovable assumptions,
and various forms of political interaction.
58. Id. at 79, 341-79.
59. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, 1989 REPORT
66-67 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 REPORT].
60. Id.
61. Id.
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of new chemicals." 2 Choice of a victim or a perpetrator perspective
does not, therefore, seem to be dictated solely by scientific method.
Another example of invoking scientific method to cloak value
choices is the criteria methodology's treatment of health risks to women
and children. When assessing human health risks from exposure to
environmental contaminants, EPA noted that it was basing its
estimations of harm on a hypothetical 155-lb. man who ate one-quarter
ounce of fish and shellfish per day, and consumed two liters of water.
"Criteria based on these assumptions," EPA concluded, "are estimated
to be protective of an adult male who experiences average exposure
conditions."' In response to a commentator who argued that this
approach might not be adequately protective of children, EPA replied
that criteria modifications to protect children should be made "only if
specific data are available. This is a highly judgmental decision, which
must be made in an individual case.' '
Other bodies that have looked at the scientific evidence of risks
to children from environmental pollution have reached rather different
conclusions. Three Canadian agencies recently stated:
It is clear that there are people who are at greater risk than
average because they are more heavily exposed (e.g., nursing
infants and those who eat large amounts of contaminated
fish) or are more susceptible (e.g., the developing fetus, new-
borns, the elderly, and those who are in poor health).'
When these groups are added to women and girls of childbearing
age-who would be at risk of harming their babies-the exceptions
probably swallow the rule. The "average" 155-lb. adult male has thus
become a minority, one that is especially resistant to health risks from
environmental contaminants. Similarly, the International Joint
Commission recently noted that when available data on fish, birds,
reptiles, and small mammals are considered along with human research,
the Commission must conclude that there is a threat to the health of our
children emanating from exposure to persistent toxic substances, even
at very low ambient levels.'
62. Id.
63. Criteria Documents, supra note 57, at 79,323-24.
64. Id. at 79,372.
65. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, ToxIc CHEMICALS IN THE GREAT LAKES AND
ASSOCIATED EFFECTS: SYNOPSIS 41 (1991).
66. 1989 REPORT, supra note 59, at 69.
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The EPA, by contrast, had already freed itself of the need to
consider data about toxic pollutants' threats to birds, reptiles, and small
mammals, because no "specific wildlife criteria methodology" was
available." The agency asserted that until the appropriate scientific
methodology was developed, criteria based on human health data would
serve to protect wildlife.6 Other examples could be extracted from the
criteria methodology and similar documents implementing the Clean
Water Act.
Implementation of complex regulatory statutes such as the Clean
Water Act entails a large number of decisions which can incorporate
either a victim perspective (ecosystem sustainability), or a perpetrator
perspective (protect unlimited growth). Depending upon which per-
spective is adopted, the regulatory arena can become either a forum for
examining the prospects for alternative futures or a bastion of the status
quo.69 What determines which role the law will play?
IV. LAW'S ROLE IN BUILDING CONSTITUENCIES FOR THE
ECOSYSTEM
As the discussion of economic considerations indicates, the form
of the law is crucial. Any law that creates a system of regulatory
decisionmaking which gives heavy weight to existing economic activity
cannot provide many occasions for exploring alternative economic
futures. Thus, the right kind of law at a minimum should not define the
possibility of significant change as legally irrelevant or impermissible.
Beyond this, procedures may be at least as important as
substance. By establishing the field of play and the rules of the game
for future encounters of conflicting ideas, the chances of meaningful
cultural change can be maximized. Efforts to root out ambiguity and
indeterminacy in programs of environmental and economic regulation
are ultimately futile and probably counterproductive. As Murray
Edelman points out, "[flor lawyers and their organized clients,
[ambiguity] is the most useful attribute of legal language. To those
directly involved, the meaning of law constantly and observably changes
with variations in group influence. '
The question becomes which actors and which constituencies
become involved in the attempt to resolve the ambiguities. Law affects
67. Criteria Documents, supra note 57, at 79,369.
68. Id.
69. See generally MILNER S. BALL, LYING DowN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR,
AND THEOLOGY (1985).
70. EDELMAN, supra note 35, at 141.
INSTITUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY
this process of constituency interaction both substantively and
procedurally. Substantive law often defines the terms of the debate by
indicating which issues and outcomes merit serious consideration, while
procedural law creates the forums and opportunities for dialogue.
Recent activities among the nongovernmental organizations and other
stakeholders involved in Great Lakes environmental issues indicate that
there are significant obstacles to building broad-based constituencies for
sustainability, and that law could play a significant role in helping to
overcome them.
A. The Problem of Public Apathy.
In the mid-1980s, when William Ashworth drove around the Great
Lakes basin in preparation for writing his bitter environmental history,
The Late, Great Lakes, he was most depressed by the lack of citizen
commitment and involvement:
It is this apathy-this, more than any single
cause-which is at the root of the Lakes' current crisis. It
is apathy that causes people to look the other way as the
waters are filled with garbage; it is apathy that allows
shorelines to be eaten away for industrial development, and
harbor floors to become poisoned deserts, and wetlands to be
turned into toxic waste dumps.
The worst thing about all this apathy, though-the
worst thing, and the most frightening-is not the problems
it inevitably leads to for the Lakes. It is the way the people
of the Great Lakes region accept those problems so
docilely."
A few years later, when the International Joint Commission
opened its biennial meeting for the first time to accept comments from
members of the public, it received an overwhelming outpouring of
citizen reaction. More than a hundred citizens, ranging from Boy
Scouts to biologists, called on the Commission and the governments of
the basin to take more vigorous action to protect the Great Lakes.
Greenpeace provided a keynote speaker, and a pageant featured people
wearing animal masks to represent the biota of the Great Lakes
71. WILLIAM ASHWORTH, THE LATE GREAT LAKES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY
245 (1986).
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ecosystem. Further, a coalition of environmental organizations gave the
Commission and the national governments a public report card, with
grades of "D" and "F" for their performance in protecting the lakes. 2
Behind the theatrics of the IJC meetings lay a massive structure of
citizen participation in several basin-wide coalitions, dozens of remedial
action planning committees, and hundreds of local and regional
environmental and conservation organizations.
Ashworth had overlooked a basic truth known to community
organizers like Saul Alinsky: "If people feel they don't have the power
to change a bad situation, then they do not think about it."73 The
surface apathy that Ashworth observed in his travels hid a considerable
amount of latent discontent. This public concern was mobilized and
made highly visible through several processes. First, groups like Great
Lakes United, Pollution Probe, Greenpeace, and the National Wildlife
Federation played the role of catalyst, providing support to help local
groups organize themselves and become involved in Great Lakes issues.
Another important factor was the availability of forums for advocacy and
self-education in the citizen advisory committees created to assist in the
development of remedial action plans for polluted areas of concern.
Finally, a sufficient number of political leaders in both countries
expressed interest in cleaning up the Great Lakes to give hope that
significant improvements might be within reach.
B. Three Obstacles to Constituency-Building
Despite an increasing coalescence of public support, it is unclear
whether this initial surge of public interest and involvement will mature
into the kind of established constituency that can effectively push for
change in a wide variety of forums, ranging from the mass culture to
specialized arenas like the regulatory process. Apart from the problem
of generating adequate resources, which is a chronic disability of most
organizations that seek to provide collective goods like ecosystem
preservation or a sustainable economy, there are three basic obstacles
that the environmental constituencies will need to overcome in order to
avoid being relegated to the margins.
1. The Expertise Dilemma. Technical expertise is a valuable
source of power in the administrative state, and those who lack access
to relevant expertise can often be safely ignored by dominant insti-
72. Bruce Kershner, Citizens Give Loud & Clear Message to the IJC, in THE
GREAT LAKES UNITED (Great Lakes United, Buffalo, N.Y.), Fall 1989.
73. ALINSKY, supra note 2, at 105.
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tutions. Speaking the language and knowing the local customs is often
a prerequisite to gaining admission to "regulatory communities" and
other settings where cultural norms are constituted and defended. 4
To find, much less to understand or critique, an important
decisionmaking document like the EPA's description of its methodology
for developing water quality criteria requires some expertise.
Such expertise generally is not beyond the grasp of the average
person. In many neighborhood environmental conflicts, ordinary
citizens have demonstrated the capacity to cut through jargon and the
mysteries of method to successfully confront experts on their own
ground. However, this kind of self-education usually requires an
enormous investment of time and energy, as well as some access to
support and assistance from friendly experts. Issues like ecosystem
preservation and sustainability lack the motivating power of an
immediate threat to personal health or property. As a result, few non-
experts may be willing to make the necessary commitment to
understanding and challenging expert values and methods.
There is also a more fundamental ambivalence about expertise
among environmental organizations, as reflected in the growing split
between "professional" and "grassroots" environmental groups. The
grassroots groups frequently view the professional environmentalists
who have already gained access to the regulatory communities as
ineffective pawns of the dominant system. Instead of trying to gain
access to existing domains of technical expertise, grassroots
organizations thus seek to confront or politically neutralize them.
In addition to these tactical and strategic differences, groups
advocating ecosystem preservation and sustainability may also have a
conceptual problem in accepting the legitimacy of the existing domains
of technical expertise. In varying degrees, an ecosystem approach
implies a mode of holistic thinking and a value of accommodation to
nature that is antithetical to the reductionist, dominating approach of
the prevailing scientific and technical culture. 5 Thus, it may be
difficult for representatives of groups that are challenging the basic
paradigms of these expert communities' to gain acceptance in them--or
even to want it.
The Great Lakes basin is an interesting arena for examining
possible resolutions of the expertise dilemma for several reasons. First,
74. Meidinger, supra note 15.
75. See, e.g., DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL
IDEAS (1977); CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE (1980).
76. See LESTER W. MILBRATH, ENVIRONMENTALISTS: VANGUARD FOR A NEW
SOCIETY (1984).
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within the region, there is a longstanding tradition of scientific inquiry
compatible with the ecosystem approach and sustainability, along with
an unusually large number of experts who are willing to assist
environmental organizations.' Second, and perhaps as a result, the
region has a diversity of advocacy groups committed to the ecosystem
approach, each embodying varying degrees of technical orientation and
sophistication. Finally, the process of remedial action planning provides
an arena within which different constituencies are being brought
together to work out the practical applications of the ecosystem
approach. It would be valuable to learn how experts and laypeople are
adjusting to each other in these advisory committees, and whether
shared understandings and ongoing relationships are emerging from the
remedial action plans.
2. The Jurisdictional Maze. A second generic obstacle to building
stable constituencies for the ecosystem approach and sustainable
development may be called the jurisdictional maze. From an ecosystem
perspective, the geographic and bureaucratic boundaries defining the
"turf' of various agencies with power to steer the course of development
in the Great Lakes basin make no sense. Moreover, the sheer size and
complexity of the governance structure is a barrier to constituency
participation in two ways. First, it is often difficult to find out which
agency, office, or combination thereof has responsibility for taking a
desired action. Even if the relevant players can be identified, getting
them to act in concert often requires a massive investment of time,
energy, and advocacy resources. Indeed, a single holdout may in the end
effectively veto a broad-based initiative. Second, jurisdictional
complexity makes it difficult to organize ecosystem constituencies,
because organizing efforts cannot be targeted at a single agency or level
of government.
However, this diversity and inertia of the system can have some
advantages in building constituencies for the ecosystem approach. If the
transition to a more sustainable society will require evolution of
different cultural norms, then having many forums in which to push for
these different perceptions is a positive benefit: it is a way of preventing
belief in sustainability from becoming a purely elite ideal, or a cult.
From an organizer's perspective, it may also be beneficial to have a
diversity of advocacy organizations and forums because this can
maximize the opportunities to get people involved. and to keep them
active.
77. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROYAL
SOCIETY OF CANADA, THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING
INSTRUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1985).
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While jurisdictional overlaps can be frustrating and wasteful, they
can also be socially valuable. 8 When parallel organizations are
addressing the same problem, each may have a competitive spur to
improve performance. This competition provides an opportunity for eco-
system constituencies to play one agency off against the other, to select
the best practices and policies as a model, and to ask the less
progressive agencies with similar responsibilities: "why aren't you doing
what they're doing?" Moreover, once some momentum for change builds
up, dispersed and overlapping authority provides some insurance against
backsliding. One large, centralized, powerful agency or government may
be easier to "capture," and thus be more vulnerable to erratic shifts in
policy than a decentralized network of many small agencies.
3. Definition of the Human Role in the Ecosystem. The final
obstacle to organizing constituencies for sustainable development is
perhaps the most difficult of all-the conundrum of defining man's
appropriate role in the ecosystem. Accepting the basic premises of the
ecosystem approach, ecology does not provide an unambiguous answer
to fundamental questions such as: what levels and forms of economic
activity are consistent with the preservation of the ecosystem? What
levels of population can be maintained within ecosystems like the Great
Lakes basin? What forms of social organization will help to achieve
these desired future states? Historically, the discipline of ecology has
been invoked to support a wide range of social theory. 9 The North
American conservation movement has never really resolved the question
of man's appropriate role in the ecosystem. Instead, as Michael Cohen
has observed, conservationists have tended to dichotomize the human
role as a choice between being either a despoiler of nature or a
tourist." To organize viable constituencies for social change, a more
positive vision is needed.
V. CONCLUSION
How can the legal system become a constructive force, helping to
reduce these barriers to effective dialogue among constituencies, rather
than an obstacle to change? While the story is still in the early stages
of unfolding, there are some hopeful signs in the Great Lakes region. In
78. See JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN
GOVERNMENT (1985).
79. Worster, supra note 75.
80. See generally MICHAEL P. COHEN, THE PATHLESS WAY: JOHN MUIR AND
AMERICAN WILDERNESS (1984).
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some of the more successful Remedial Action Plans, the decisionmaking
process has transcended the traditional bureaucratic approach in which
experts decide among themselves and then try to defend their decision
before a skeptical or hostile public. Instead, a more equal and
cooperative process has evolved in which the specialized knowledge of
the experts blends with the local knowledge of the citizenry to provide
a richer, more complete understanding of the prospects for restoring a
degraded ecosystem. Jurisdictional complexity and turf fights are still
common, but as the early Remedial Action Plans move toward
implementation there seem to be enough examples of coordinated effort
to suggest that jurisdictional conflicts can eventually be sorted out.
One reason for these hopeful developments may be found in the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The task of developing a
Remedial Action Plan under the Agreement is so broad that no single
person or organization can hope to have all the answers. Shared
decisionmaking is virtually implicit in the tasks of defining "impaired
uses" and "restoring beneficial uses" as specified in the Agreement.
Further, the remedial actions needed for full restoration--or even for full
diagnosis of the problems in many polluted areas--will often be so costly
and demand such a wide array of actions that the need for cooperation
will be obvious to all participants. Thus, although its status as binding
domestic law may be questionable, the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement creates an alternative decisionmaking model to the existing
regulatory programs, and a source of authority that may be invoked by
those who are dissatisfied with the status quo. Because this alternative
model is not a highly detailed one, the Agreement creates a structured
opportunity for constituencies to define, or redefine, their relationships
and interests in a shared resource. If the legal system can build on
these hopeful developments and evolve better doctrines and procedures
to promote useful dialogue, then we may have the framework within
which the societies and communities of the Great Lakes basin can
address the final, and most difficult barrier: working out a common
vision of what a sustainable, ecosystem-regarding society would be like.
